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Abstract 
This study involved the construction and partial validation 
of two scales (Ultimate Rescuer, UR and Specialness, SP) that 
Yalom (1960) suggests measure the beliefs one utilizes as a 
defense against death anxiety. Evidence for how they relate to 
cognitive fear of death measures (Threat Index, TI, Templer Death 
Anxiety Scale, DAS', and Collett-Lester Fear of Death Scale, CL) 
was obtained. One hundred and twenty-nine items considered to 
best represent the two beliefs were counterbalanced and adminis- 
tered to 150 introductory psychology students. Those items with 
item-total correlation coefficients with a probability of .001 or 
better were retained. Two scales, with 15 items per scale, were 
constructed from these items. Each scale was found to have high 
internal consistency reliability, (UR, r = .89; SP, r = .82) and 
were cross validated on a second similar population (UR, r = 86; 
SP, r = .87). Factor analysis resulted in the UR items all 
loading on 1 factor, while the SP items loaded on 2 factors. 
Construct validation procedures revealed mixed results. The 
expected negative correlation between the defense scales and fear 
of death measures was only found for the SP Scale and the CL. No 
correlation was found for the UR Scale. T-tests for criterion 
groups revealed that the UR group had significantly higher UR 
scores and significantly lower fear of death scores. No differ- 
ences were found for the SP group. In general, the results 
partrally establish a relationship between the Ultimate Rescuer 
and Specialness Scales and conscious fear of death, thus lending 
some support to Yalom's (1980) theory of death anxiety, 
implication for future research is discussed. 
The 
• One aspect of thanatological research that consistently has 
been controversial is that area concerned with fear of death and 
death anxiety. In the past, attempts to measure fear of death or 
death anxiety have utilized numerous approaches and have frequent- 
ly met with considerable criri'cisro. These approaches have included 
procedures such as questionnaires, interviews and a variety of 
rating scales and check lists of death attitudes * Many resear- 
chers prefer to use these methods because they have psychometric 
properties that are more reliable and valid than more subjective 
approaches. However, such procedures are bound by the theoreti- 
cal assumption that an individual is conscious of his or her fear 
of death or death anxiety. Consequently, the findings of such 
studies are open to the criticism that only superficial surface- 
level attitudes toward death have been investigated (Fulton, 
1961,- Schultz, 1978). 
Other methods of assessing fear of death or death anxiety 
which have attempted to avoid these criticisms have not fared 
much better. These approaches have been based on the assumption 
that fear of death and death anxiety cannot be measured directly, 
simply because such fear and anxiety is kept from consciousness 
by various defense mechanisms. Thus, these approaches have 
relied on the use of techniques which are purported to tap 
directly into the unconscious, bypassing the defenses, and have 
included the use of the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), word 
2. 
association tasks, sentence completion tests and the galvanic 
skin response (GSR). As would be expected, studies utilizing 
such procedures have come under considerable criticism because of 
their lack of reliability, unestablished validity, and mostly in- 
con s i s t en t results. 
In their review of death literature Kastenbaum and Costa 
(1977) have pointed out many of the shortcomings of these various 
methods. They maintain, for example, that the GSR, pioneered for 
death attitude research by Alexander, Colley and Adlerstein 
( 1957) has been used in a variety of studies (Alexander & 
Adlerstein, 1958, 1959; Carson, 1974; Feifel & Branscomb, 1973; 
Golding, Atwood & Goodman, 1966; Magni, 1972; Templerj 1971) 
which have consistently shown that death-related words elicit 
more autonomic arousal than neutral or basal words. However, 
autonomic arousal may or may not be accompanied by conscious 
awareness, and therefore cannot be used as a reliable index of 
unverbalized anxiety. By comparison, other researchers have 
utilized latency measures from word association and tachisto- 
scopic recognition tasks (Golding, Atwood & Goodman, 1966; Lester 
& Lester, 1970; Lowrey, 1966) in order to make inferences about 
death anxiety. Researchers utilizing these procedures report 
statistically significant longer response latencies, in some cases 
as little as three tenths of a second, to death related words 
than to neutral words. Such increases in response latency have 
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have been viewed by these researchers as indicative of defensive 
processes and elevated levels of fear of death. Kastenbaum and 
Costa (1977) caution that while longer latencies may be indica- 
tive of a differentiation between death related and neutral 
words, it is doubtful that this is evidence of a defensive 
system. If in fact a defensive system exists, it would presuma- 
bly offer more protection than the fraction of a second's worth 
as was found in this study. 
Projective techniques such as the TAT also have been used in 
several other investigations (Kimsey, Roberts, & Logan, 1972; 
Lieberman & Caplan, 1970; Rhudick & Dibner, 1961; Shrut, 1958). 
In these studies the respondent is asked to make up a story about 
a series of moderately ambiguous pictures. Degree of death 
concern is determined by the frequency with which the respondent 
makes references to death. However, Kurlychek (1978) and Schulz 
(1978) suggest that projective techniques such as the TAT lose 
their strength due to difficulties in scoring, lack of reliabi- 
lity and validity, and their overall subjectivity. 
Kastenbaum and Costa ( 1977) have also reported several other 
studies investigating unconscious death concern through indirect 
methods. These have included recalled dream content (Handal & 
Rychlak, 1971), self ratings of mood after exposure to neutral, 
erotic and death-related reading matter (Paris & Goodstein, 
1966), semantic differential scores and word recognition tasks. 
4. 
(Christ, 1961; Lester & Lester, 1970; and Martin & Wrightsman, 
1965). 
Death Anxiety Versus Fear of Death. 
Unfortunately, much of the controversy surrounding this 
research has resulted from a blurring of the distinction between 
death anxiety and fear of death. The work of Yalom (1980) 
offers a theoretical framework that could provide a means of 
ending the controversy. As Yalom (1980) points out, a variety 
of terms have been used interchangeably to describe concerns 
about death such as: death anxiety, fear of death, mortal 
terror, and fear of finitude. Philosophers referred to it as the 
fragility of being (Jaspers, 1932), dreaU of non-being 
(Kierkegaard, 1956), the impossibility of further possibility 
(Heidegger, 1962), and the ontological anxiety (Tillich, 1952). 
Other authors have suggested that fear of death is a composite of 
a number of smaller discrete fears. Diggory and Rothman (1961) 
for example, asked a large sample of individuals drawn from the 
general population to rank order several consequences of death. 
Of these common fears several seem tangential to personal death: 
fear of pain, which lies on this side of death; fear regarding an 
afterlife, which attempts to make death a non-terminal event; and 
fear which centers around others, which is not a fear concerning 
oneself. The fear which seemed to be the center of concern was 
5. 
the fear of personal extinction illustrated in statements such as 
"my plans and projects would come to an end" and ”I could no 
longer have any experiences". 
In a similar vein Choron (1964), after reviewing the major 
philosophic views about death, distinguished three types of death 
fear; what comes after death, the event of dying, and ceasing to 
be. The first two are fears related to death (Kastenbaum & 
Aisenberg, 1972), while the third, "ceasing to be" (obliteration, 
extinction, annihilation), according to Yalom (1980) is more 
central to the fear of death and is the focus of his theoretical 
approach. 
According to Yalom (1980), the variety of descriptors 
covering concerns about death have lead to imprecise definitions 
of fear of death and death anxiety. In order to address this 
issue, he re-examined the constructs of fear of death and death 
anxiety and offered a distinction based on existential theory; 
specifically, that the basic fundamental concern in life is 
death. His view holds that the terror of death is ubiquitous in 
nature and of such magnitude that one's life energies are 
considerably strained defending against it. Death anxiety plays 
a major role in our internal experience "... it haunts as does 
nothing else; it rumbles continuously under the surface; it is a 
dark unsettling presence at the rim of consciousness" (Yalom, 
1980, pp. 27). In fact, this position maintains that death 
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anxiety is the primal source of all anxiety and that this "primal 
death anxiety" is quite distinct from fear of death. 
To understand this position more fully a distinction between 
fear and anxiety must be made. Yalom (1980) suggests that 
Kierkegaard (1957) was the first to offer a clear distinction 
between fear and anxiety. Fear is something which an individual 
experiences which has its source in some identifiable thing or 
object. Anxiety, on the other hand, is experienced by an 
individual but has no locatable source as the cause of the 
discomfort. Since anxiety has no identifiable source in the 
environment, the anxiety can be neither understood nor con- 
fronted. Unable to confront this anxiety, feelings of helpless- 
ness are generated in an individual leading to even further dread 
or anxiety. People seek to combat and protect themselves by 
transforming anxiety into the fear of some identifiable object 
which exists in their environment (Yalom, 1980). As Rollo May 
(1977) states "anxiety seeks to become fear" (pp. 207). Once 
this is accomplished this object can be avoided, allies against 
it can be sought out, magic rituals can be developed to placate 
it or a systematic campaign to detoxify it may be planned. As a 
result of constantly being transformed into something, primal 
death anxiety is rarely encountered in its original form. 
7. 
Defense Against Death Anxiety 
Empirical Investigations. Closely related to the transforma- 
tion of anxiety to fear is the development of a system of 
defenses. Investigations concerned with how individuals protect 
themselves from death anxiety have been undertaken formally 
by several authors. Osarchuk and Tatz, (1973) developed an 
objective instrument (The Belief in Afterlife Scale), designed 
to measure the function a belief in afterlife might have in 
helping an individual deal with anxiety over death. The scale 
was developed to determine if the failure to find appreciable 
correlates with fear of death reported in the literature was 
the result of subjects being able to keep their death anxiety 
to a moderate level by means of defensive measures. They 
postulated that perhaps the belief in an afterlife is a commonly 
used device for dealing with the fear that death means a loss 
of things one has valued plus a confrontation with the unknown. 
Strong believers in an afterlife who were exposed to death 
threat showed an increase in scores on an alternative belief 
in afterlife scale while the scores of a control group and 
a group with a weak belief in afterlife remained unchanged. 
The results were interpreted as confirming the hypothesis 
that a strong belief in an afterlife may serve to lower death 
anxiety. 
Using a somewhat different approach, Handal & Rychlak 
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(1971) investigated the relationship between the death content 
of dreams and scores on Templer's Death Anxiety Scale (DAS) 
(Templer, 1970). Using a sample of college students Handal 
and Rhychlak, (1971) found a "U" shaped function when relating 
death content in dreams to scores on Templer's Death Anxiety 
Scale, (DAS) (Templer, 1970). Both high and low scorers on 
the DAS reported significantly more dreams about death and 
significantly more dreams with unpleasant content than did 
moderate scorers. They interpreted these results as providing 
validity for the DAS as a measure of death anxiety (high scores) 
and as a measure of repression of death anxiety (low scores). 
Handal (1975) examined the relationship between the DAS 
and a measure of repression on the Defense Mechanism Inventory 
(Gleser & Ihilevich, 1969). He found a significant negative 
correlation between this measure of repression and the DAS. 
The relationship indicated that subjects who reported little 
or no death anxiety were associated with the use of the defense 
mechanisms of denial and repression. 
Several other studies have investigated the relationships 
between death anxiety and repression using Byrne's (1963) 
Repression-Sensitization Scale (R-S). The R-S scale is purported 
to measure an individual's reaction to perceived threatening 
stimuli along a continuum. One end of the continuum measures 
repression or the strong tendency to repress, deny, or avoid 
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perceived threat. The other end measures sensitization charac- 
terized by strong tendencies to approach, confront and intel- 
lectualize about the perceived threat. Poliak (1979), reviewed 
the empirical studies involving the R-S scale and Death Anxiety. 
He reported that all but one study found a consistently signifi- 
cant .relationship between the R-S scale and Death Anxiety. 
Studies by Tolor and Reznikoff (1968), Dickstein (1972), Handal 
and Rychlak (1971) and Handal (1973) have all found a relation- 
ship beteween low death anxiety and repressive defenses as 
well as high death anxiety and sensitization. 
Noyes (1981) while examining the responses of victims 
of life threatening accidents reported that on a psychological 
level one could clearly see a defense against the threat of 
death. His subjects reported that during these experiences 
they felt like detached observers, as if the accident was 
not happening to them. He suggested that this serves as a 
buffer against the threat of injury or death. He concluded 
that on a psychological level a defense against the threat 
of death was clearly visible. 
Numerous researchers have investigated potential mediating 
effects that religious beliefs and religiosity have toward 
death anxiety. Although not specifically investigating defense 
mechanisms per se, the implication is that one's strengthened 
religious belief acts as a buffer agaihst fear of death or 
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death anxiety. Templer (1972) compared the scores of 267 
religiously involved persons on the DAS and a specially prepared 
religious inventory. He found that religiously involved persons 
who were more religious in the traditional sense (ie. stronger 
religious convictions and attachment, attend religious functions 
more frequently, certain of life after death, and interpret 
the Bible more literally) have lower DAS scores. In fact 
he found that for both males and females scores on the DAS 
for those groups were lower than in any other research involving 
the DAS. 
Leming (1980) also investigated the possibility that 
religion serves as a defense against death anxiety. In his 
study he attempted to test Homan's (1965) contention that 
religion can both arouse anxiety concerning death as well 
as alleviate death anxiety. In reviewing the literature on 
the relationship between death and religiosity Leming (1980) 
stated that of the 23 research investigations conducted, 10 
demonstrated that religious factors such as religious commitment, 
religious orthodoxy, religious practice, religious devotionalism 
and beliefs in afterlife are significantly related to the 
reduction of death fear and/or death anxiety. Moreover, 3 
of the 23 studies surveyed indicated a significant positive 
relationship between fear of death and religiosity, 3 demon- 
strated a curvilinear relationship indicating that those who 
have moderate to middle of the road commitment have significantly 
higher intensity of death anxiety, and 7 found no significant 
relationship. 
Leming (1980) believed that these conflicting and contradic- 
tory findings could be reinterpreted in light of Homan's (1965) 
contention that the nature of the relationship between fear 
of death and religiosity is curvilinear. To test this hypothe- 
sis he administered the Leming Death Fear Scale (1980) and 
a specially prepared scale of Religiosity, consisting of subsec- 
tions on religious beliefs, religious ritual and religious 
experience, to 372 residents of Northfield, Minnesota. Correla- 
tions between religiosity scale scores and fear of death scores, 
controlling for age, social class and religious preference, 
revealed a curvilinear relationship. That is, scores that 
were high or low on religiosity were associated with lower 
death anxiety scores while moderate religiosity scores were 
associated with significantly higher death anxiety scores. 
He interpreted these findings as being supportive of Homan's 
(1965) contention. The non-religiously committed individual, 
need not fear divine judgment or afterlife. His or her fears 
are related to the disruptive effects of death on his or her 
social life. the highly committed religious individual is 
able to redefine his or her death as a religious victory and 
anticipates rewards in the afterlife. However, individuals 
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with moderate religious commitment fear both the afterlife 
as well as death effects on his or her social life. 
Developmental Concepts of Death and Defence. According to 
Yalom (1980), primal death anxiety is first encountered by 
each individual early on in life. The literature is filled 
with studies suggesting that children enter into a relationship 
with death at a very early age (Anthony, 1972; Bluebond-Langer, 
1977; Brant, 1972; Eissler, 1959; Freud, 1960; Furman, 1974; 
Kastenbaum & Aisenberg, 1972; Klein, 1948; Maurer, 1964; Piaget, 
1954; Rochlin, 1965, 1967; Stern, 1951; Sully, 1914). Yalom 
(1980) arguing from his theoretical position, states that 
children's beliefs about death are terrifying and that they 
feel compelled to find ways to set their minds at ease. Evidence 
for this is found throughout the stages of children's conceptual- 
ization of death. Yalom (1980) maintains that the child 
is caught in a "herky jerky" process of knowing too much too 
early resulting in the child having to find ways to deal with 
the anxiety that knowledge causes until gradually the child 
is prepared to accept what the child originally knew. In 
other words children go through an orderly progression of 
stages in awareness of death and in the methods they use to 
deal with their fear of death. These methods are described 
as denial based, designed primarily to assist the child to 
grow up tolerating the straight facts about life and death 
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that we do not or cannot know. 
Lonetto (1980), in his book on Children’s Concepts of 
Death extensively reviewed the literature concerning the various 
developinental stages children pass through in their understanding 
of death. In his summary of the literature he reported that 
children from 3 to 5 years of age view death as being temporary 
or reversible or living on under changed circumstances. He 
also suggested that separation for these children is equated 
with death of the individual they are separated from, in particu- 
lar, a separation from mother. In the next stage children 
from 6 through 8 years of age see death as one who is personi- 
fied. Death is characterized as an external agent who 
can catch you and take you away. Death is viewed as the "boogie 
man" or the "grim reaper", or a ghost-like monsterous creature 
that is invisible. Children at this age feel that death usually 
occurs to older people or younger people who did not see death 
coming in time to escape. Death is no longer reversible, 
temporary, or continuing to live under changed circumstances. 
Finally, children of older ages, from 9 years through 12, 
are in the final phases of the process of conceptualizing death. 
The child then begins to use logic rather than magic to see 
death as the end of life, as a scary or painful event as well 
as in more abstract terms. 
It is in these very stages that Yalom (1980) sees the 
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child as knowing of death then developing denial based strategies 
in order to cope with this knowledge. The work of Rochlin 
(1967) involving exploring the play activities of children 
ages 3 to 5 years lends support to this contention. He maintains 
that very young children realize that death is inevitable 
and build defensive play stategies to ward off the effects 
of this knowledge. He suggests that children do not have 
an adult view of death but that they do have an understanding 
of death and organize their play and other activities to protect 
themselves against the fears associated with such an understand- 
ing . 
Furman (1964) suggests that very young children are capable 
of understanding that death is universal and inevitable. 
Consequently, they protect themselves from the frightening 
mystery by denying the power of death through their words 
and actions. Similarly, Lonetto (1980) argues that because 
the concept of death is an abstraction it is through playing 
and drawing the child is best able to cope with his or her 
fears about death. Consequently it is easier for the child 
to oppose death when it is shaped into a person or transformed 
into a horrible demon or monster. It is in this fashion that 
the child defends himself/herself against the knowledge of 
death. 
Yalom (1980) suggests the 3 to 5 year old child views 
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death as temporary and reversible and almost suspended animation 
and/or sleep. Moreover, this view is reinforced by such things 
as television cartoons that show characters blown apart, flat- 
tened, crushed or mutilated in an endless number of ways then 
finally miraculously coming alive again. According to Yalom 
(1980) this represents the child's way of denying death. 
Nagy (1948) made it clear that children even with imperfect 
knowledge considered death to be dreadful and frightening. 
A few exerpts of her interviews with children reveal that 
children see death as horrifying; talked of being trapped in 
a nailed down coffin crying for one's self, under earth lying 
buried for a hundred years then turning into wood, feeling 
the cold, turning blue and green, being unable to breathe 
and others. Nagy (1948) suggested that the child either consi- 
ders- death as temporary or denies it completely by equating 
it with departure or sleep. Yalom (1980) suggests that what 
is clear from her work is that children have considerable 
knowledge regarding death and suggests that there is nothing 
temporary or incomplete about being eaten by worms or remaining 
forever under the dirt and no longer feeling anything. Clearly 
Nagy's (1948) data indicate that children, even with imperfect 
knowledge, consider death dreadful and frightening. Because 
they are terrified, children feel compelled to find ways to 
set their minds at ease. 
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In the 6 to 8 year old category denial of death according 
to Yalom (1980) is evident in children's personification of 
death and their belief that children do not die. The young 
child views death as occurring to older people;the very young 
do not die! The child's belief is frequently challenged when 
he or she encounters the death of another child. This is 
often resolved by making the distinction between dying and 
being killed, or as Nagy (1948) states keeping death at a 
reasonable distance so that they would have time for an escape. 
Personification of death too is a denial mechanism. Children 
in this age group go through a period in which they anthropo- 
morphize death. According to Yalom (1980) death personification 
acts as an anxiety emollient. As long as the child believes 
that death is brought by some outside force or figure, he 
or she is safe from the really terrible truth that death is 
not external but "that from the beginning of life one carries 
within the spores of one's own death" (Yalom, 1980 p. 99). 
Similarly, Lonetto (1980) states: 
Personifications not only make death visible but 
also human like in appearance. This visibility 
can be for just a brief time before death carries 
a person off. If one acts quickly, this is just 
enough time to outmaneuver death. Therefore, death 
can assume a variety of external roles and can 
occur only when someone is caught by the 'death- 
man'. It then makes a good deal of sense, from 
the viewpoint of the child who personifies death, 
that'-,the aged and infirmed are hardly in a good 
position to run away or hide from death, even if 
they can 'see' death. In contrast, the young and 
healthy can and do escape from death. (P. 93). 
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Children 9 through 13 years according to Lonetto (1980) 
are in the process of a shift in thinking resulting in accept- 
ing logical causal modes of analyzing the events of the 
world over the previous magical thinking. He maintains 
that this shift in thinking corresponds to an understanding 
of external time. The 9 to 12 year old begins to see death 
in biological and abstract terms. Therefore the child begins 
to see death as the end of life. 
This transition period is often referred to as a period 
of latency. Lonetto (1980) asserts that the research of 
Alexander and Adlerstein (1958) tends to support the notion 
of benign latency. He finds that it is especially surprising 
that children would be so calm about death particularly 
since it is during this phase in their development that 
they have begun to accept biological types of explanations 
over animistic, magical ones. It would be expected that 
as the child begins to understand death as being inevitable, 
universal and final, that the child would display far more 
anxiety over death than he or she appears to. 
Yalom (1980) suggests that it is in the presence of 
this overwhelming knowledge that the child searches for 
reassurance , ..."he or she must deal with death; he or 
she may panic in the face of it, deny it, personify it, 
scoff at it, repress it, displace it, but deal with it the 
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child must" (pp. 91). He belives that this period of latency 
does not diminish death anxiety but results from it. As 
a child begins to see death in biological and abstract terras., 
the childhood denial systems are no longer effective. The 
child’s shift in favor of biological explanations permit 
him or her to face once again the inevitability and finality 
of death, creating anxiety and a search for an alternative 
mode of coping with these facts. Yalom (1980) asserts that 
it is during this latency or transition period that the 
child beings to acquire more efficient and sophisticated 
forms of denial, resulting in his or her explicit fear of 
death becoming gradually unconscious. 
In summary, evidence suggests that children comprehend 
that life will inevitably end and apply this knowledge to 
themselves causing great anxiety. Yalom (1980) maintains 
that a major developmental task is to deal with this anxiety. 
He suggests that the child does so in two major ways: by 
creating immortality myths or, by believing the myths offered 
by adults, the child denies the inevitability and permanence 
o'^f death; and secondly, by altering inner reality the child 
denies his or her own helplessness before the presence of 
death. Yalom (1980) states "the child believes both in his 
or her personal specialness, omnipotence, and invulnerability 
and in the existence of some external personal force or 
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being that will deliver him or her from the fate that awaits 
others" (p. 109). Rochlin (1967), recognized this process 
when he stated "that what is remarkable is not that children 
arrive at adult views of the cessation of life, but rather 
how tenaciously throughout life adults hold to the child's 
beliefs and how readily they revert to them" (p. 63). Yalom 
(1980) suggests in adults the defense system consists of 
two principal defense mechanisms: a belief in an ultimate 
rescuer and a belief in one's own specialness. 
Ultimate Rescuer and Specialness Defenses. Yalom (1980) 
maintains that, while denial of death anxiety is ubiquitous, 
and exists in a variety of modes, ultimate rescuer and special- 
ness represent two major bulwarks of denial. These two 
fundamental modes of defending against death are based in 
the archaic beliefs that one is personally inviolable and/or 
protected eternally by an ultimate rescuer (Yalom, 1980). 
According to Yalom (1980), these two beliefs are powerful 
because of the reinforcement they receive from the circumstances 
of early life, and from widespread culturally sanctioned 
myths involving immortality and the existence of a personal, 
observing deity. Yalom's (1980) existential point of view 
holds that a person who has adopted a belief in specialness, 
believes deeply in his or her own specialness and invulnera- 
bility, The basic boundaries of existence are known by 
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all, yet deep down we feel "that the rule of mortality applies 
to others but certainly not to ourselves" (Yalom, 1980, 
pp. 118). For example, one of the most common reactions 
of a person first learning that he or she has a terminal 
illness is denial. This denial reaction allows the individual 
to cope with the anxiety of the life threatening illness, 
but it is also a function of the individual's belief in 
his or her inviolability. In these situations where an 
individual is forced to come to terms with death the superfi- 
cial cognitive awareness of death gives way to the stark 
realization that one is really going to die. This knowledge 
results in the dissolution of the specialness myth. One 
becomes aware that one is finite, one of many, and that the 
universe does not acknowledge one's specialness. Moreover, 
one learns that what one wishes or believes is unrelated 
to the immutable truths of existence and non-existence (Yalom, 
1980). A defense or belief in personal specialness is adaptive 
because it enables the individual to construe a dysphoric 
world in favorable terms. It allows the individual to deal 
with the reality that in his or her existence he or she is 
isolated and insignificant in relation to the whole. Moreover, 
it offers protection from the knowledge that death lies 
at the edge of consciousness. The belief in specialness 
entails a belief that one is exempt from the natural law 
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that governs the external world. An individual utilizing this 
defense knows of death, but that it happens to others. It 
allows the individual to encounter danger without being over- 
whelmed by the threat of personal extinction. According to 
Yalom (1980) the courage thus generated beget what many have 
called the human being's "natural" striving for competence, 
effectance, power, and control. The extent to which one 
attains power, one's death fear is further assauged, effective- 
ly reinforcing and maintaining a belief in one's specialness, 
"Getting ahead, achieving, accumulating material wealth, 
leaving works behind as imperishable monuments becomes a way of 
life which effectively conceals the mortal questions churning 
below" (Yalom, 1980, pp. 121). 
In addition to belief in their own specialness, human 
beings are protected from death anxiety by their belief in an 
ultimate rescuer. This defense is based on the belief that 
there exists a personal omnipotent force or being that eternal- 
ly observes, loves and protects us. This belief has been 
rooted in human culture since the beginning of recorded 
history. No early culture has ever believed that humans were 
alone in an indifferent world. The rescuer does not have to be 
a supernatural being; some individuals find their rescuer in 
earthly surroundings, either in a leader or in some higher 
cause. As Yalom (1980) so eloquently suiranarizes: 
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Human beings for millenniums, have conquered their 
fear of death in this manner and have chosen to lay 
down their freedom, indeed their lives, for the 
embrace of some higher figure or personified cause 
(pp. 129). 
While an individual may lean towards one of these basic 
defenses more than the other, most individuals utilize both 
beliefs in an attempt to ward off death anxiety. People 
rationalize that because they are being eternally watched over 
and protected by a force or being concerned with their welfare, 
they must be unique and special. If they were not special this 
force would not be concerned with them. 
The work of Noyes (1981) provides further evidence for the 
use of psychological defenses in relation to death threatening 
experiences. His findings closely resemble the beliefs of 
ultimate rescuer and specialness. He factor-analyzed the 
responses of 189 accident victims who had near death experien- 
ces. A distinction was made between this group and those indi- 
viduals experiencing serious illness. He reported three 
dimensions associated with these experiences which included 
depersonalization, hyperalertness and mystical consciousness. 
These dimensions appeared meaningful in terms of the endangered 
personality's effort to cope with the threat to life. His 
descriptions of the experiences of these individuals corres- 
ponded closely to Yalom's (1980) specialness and ultimate 
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rescuer beliefs. Some individuals reported that they had a 
feeling of special importance or destiny and that their lives 
seemed to take on a sense of mission. Closely related to this 
was also a sense of invulnerability or an immunity to danger 
and a sense of mastery over the affairs of life. Yet others 
reported that they felt God was responsible for their survival 
and consequently felt closer to him or specially favored by 
him. Others reported a sense of continued existence either 
before or after death. Many others reported that near death 
experiences had caused an assurance of afterlife. 
It is important to note that the events that interested 
Noyes (1981) within the experience only lasted a matter of 
seconds, so these were very brief experiences. He concluded 
that this is an apparent emergency mechanism that is available 
to us in time of extreme danger that might protect us until we 
are able to come to terms with the painful reality of what has 
happened. For many of the individuals these experiences served 
to confirm strong beliefs in inviolability and in afterlife 
consequently reducing their cognitive fear of death. 
Yalom (1980) suggests these types of experiences may, upon 
subsequent reflection, temporarily weaken an individual's 
defenses allowing anxiety to flood into consciousness resulting 
in a individual having to consider, suddenly and in a way he or 
she never had before, the reality of his or her own personal 
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mortality. Clearly, the sudden recognition of one's own 
mortality can result in death anxiety entering into conscious- 
ness. 
In summary, the existential paradigm offered here des- 
cribes two fundamental defenses against ubiquitous death 
anxiety. Human beings protect themselves from death by 
utilizing a belief in their specialness and personal inviola- 
bility, and a belief in an ultimate rescuer who will save them 
from the inevitable consequence of life. Occasionally, some 
riveting experiences may temporarily weaken an individual's 
defenses allowing anxiety to flood into consciousness. A near 
death experience, for example, can result in an individual 
having to consider the reality of his or her own personal 
mortality. This sudden recognition of one's own mortality can 
result in death anxiety entering into consciousness. Eventual- 
ly, however, the tear in the defensive fabric is mended, and 
the escaping death anxiety is dealt with through defensive 
measures. To illustrate, consider the role of the physician 
who is confronted, almost daily, with issues of life and death. 
This constant exposure to death would be expected to put 
considerable strain on the physician's defensive systems and 
bring the reality of death more clearly into focus. Yet, as 
Wood and Robinson (1984) suggest, it is in the confrontation 
with illness that the physician is provided with the means for 
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strengthening his or her defenses. They maintain that the 
physician's role as the successful healer, apart from reinforc- 
ing a patient's belief in an ultimate rescuer, reinforces the 
physician's belief in his or her own specialness. Moreover, 
Wood and Robinson (1984) state that because "the physician 
often fulfills the role of the ultimate rescuer, his own belief 
in an ultimate rescuer is reinforced" (pp. 420). Thus, "The 
more the physician sees himself as being special, the more he 
believes in the existence of an ultimate rescuer, and the less 
he fears death" (pp. 420). 
Measurement of Defense Against Death Anxiety. Direct Approach 
Rationale. Given the foregoing theoretical formulations 
regarding the unconscious nature of death anxiety, our defenses 
against it, and the research difficulties in measuring fear of 
death and death anxiety, it seemed reasonable to approach the 
problem using a somewhat different research strategy. Clearly, 
death anxiety, when viewed from an existential theoretical 
perspective, is hardly amenable to direct assessment. Yet, 
there exists a large body of research literature which reflects 
an attempt to do just that. Unfortunately, the validity and 
reliability of these methods are questionable and their 
findings refutable. Using a somewhat different approach, other 
studies have attempted to measure conscious fear of death and 
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clearly such fears can be experienced on many levels. An 
individual may worry about the act of dying, fear the pain that 
may be associated with dying, mourn the end of personal 
experience or, as Yalom (1980) states: 
... consider death as rationally and dispassionately 
as the Epicureans who concluded simply that death 
holds no terror because 'where I am, death is notj 
where death is, I am not. Therefore death is nothing 
to me' (pp. 45). 
However, these responses are merely conscious reflections on 
the phenomenon of death; a superficial cognitive "fear" that is 
far different from the primal anxiety one has about death. 
Perhaps a better understanding of death anxiety and fear of 
death can be obtained by bridging the gap between the two. 
What is being suggested is that somewhere between primal 
death anxiety and conscious fear of death lies the denial based 
defensive beliefs that one is eternally protected by an ultimate 
rescuer' and that one is special or personally inviolable. 
While it may not be possible to assess death anxiety, an 
examination of the defenses of ultimate rescuer (UR) and 
specialness (SP) may reveal how effective they are in keeping 
death anxiety from consciousness. Moreover, it can be argued 
that the more effectively anxiety is kept from consciousness 
the lesser will be the conscious fear of death. 
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It was the purpose of the present study to develop an 
instrument which would establish the extent to which individuals 
used SP and UR defenses. Such an instrument would be used in 
conjunction with already established measures of conscious fear 
of death to determine the extent to which the defenses were 
effective in controlling conscious fear of death. 
Fear of Death Measures. Several measures of conscious 
fear of death have been developed but not all have enjoyed wide 
acceptance and use. Perhaps the most widely used and tested of 
these instruments have been Templer's Death Anxiety Scale (DAS) 
(Templer, 1970); the Collett-Lester Fear of Death Scale (CL) 
(Collett & Lester, 1969); and the Threat Index (Tl) (Kreiger, 
Epting & Leitner, 1974). The DAS consists of 15 statement's 
related to death and dying to which the respondent answers true 
or false as applied to him or her. The higher the score, the 
greater the degree of death anxiety the respondent is assumed 
to have. (it should be noted that death "anxiety" as measured 
by this scale would more fittingly correspond to fear within 
the context of the present argument.) The DAS has been 
demonstrated to have validity and reliability (Templer, 1970; 
Templer & Ruff, 1971; Templer, Ruff & Franks, 1971; Templer, 
1972a; Templer, 1972b; Tarter, Templer & Perley, 1974; Templer, 
Lester & Ruff, 1974; Salter & Templer, 1979; Templer, & Salter, 
1979) although its development was concerned with treating fear 
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of death as though it were unidimensional. 
It was because of concerns with unidimensionality, that 
Collett and Lester attempted to develop a scale that would be 
multidimensional in nature. Their instrument, the Gollett- 
Lester Fear of Death Scale (CL), requires the respondent to 
rate 36 items concerned with death and dying on a 6 point 
scale. The score on each of the 36 items is then used to 
provide an overall score plus scores on four sub-scales: the 
fear of death of self (DS), the fear of death of other (DO), the 
fear of dying of self (DYS), the fear of dying of other (DYO). 
Research with this instrument has established its reliability 
and validity (Durlak, 1972; Dickstein, 1977; Lester, 1974) 
although no factor analytic work was undertaken to determine 
whether or not the instrument had four factors which correspon- 
ded to the four sub-scales. Correlations between the CL and 
its four sub scales and the DAS are reported to be high 
(Dickstein, 1977). 
The Threat Index (Tl) is an instrument which has a sound 
theoretical basis. Founded on Kelly's Psychology of Personal 
Constructs (Kelly, 1955), the TI requires respondents to rate 
"self", "preferred self", and "own death" on each of the 40 
bipolar dimensions. The greater the number of discrepanci'B's 
between "self" and "own death" on the ratings of the bipolar 
dimensions, the more a respondent would fear death. Extensive 
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investigations into the TI have yielded positive and adequate 
evidence that the TI is psychometrically sound (Krieger et al, 
1979; Rainey & Epting, 1977; Neimeyer & Dingemans 1980; Wood & 
Robinson, 1982; Epting, Rainey & Weiss, 1979). In addition, a 
significant relationship between the TI and the Collett- 
Lester Fear of Death Scale as well as Templer's Death Anxiety 
Scale has been established (Kreiger, et al, 1974; Neimeyer & 
Dingemans, 1980; Neimeyer, et al, 1977; Kreiger, 1977; Neimeyer 
& Chapman, 1978; Wood £t Robinson, 1982). 
While two of these instruments have purported to measure 
anxiety about death unidimensionally (DAS, TI) Durlak and Cost 
(1982) through factor analysis concluded that the scales all 
load on more than one factor indicating their multidimensional 
nature and factorial complexity. They caution that interpreta- 
tions of results becomes difficult when these instruments are 
completed by different subject populations under different 
experimental situations. 
While there are discrepancies regarding the unidimensional 
or multidimensional nature of these various death attitude 
questionnaires it is the theoretical position of this paper 
that death attitude questionnaires are simply measuring a 
cognitive fear related to death as opposed to existential death 
anxiety. Consequently while these scales may be in fact 
multidimensional it is felt that they would simply be measuring 
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different aspects of a conscious cognitive fear towards death. 
It is therefore enough to show that these scales are in fact 
measuring these cognitive conscious attitudes and are correlated 
with one another to provide support for this thesis. 
Thus, it was the purpose of this study to develop an 
instrument which would assess the degree to which an individual 
utilized the SP and UR defenses and how these defenses relate 
to fear of death as measured by the TI, the DAS and the CL. 
Moreover, an attempt was made to partially validate this new 
instrument through the use of criterion groups who would be 
expected to rely heavily on either the UR or SP defense. While 
it is hypothesized that most individuals utilize either the UR 
or SP defense or some combination of both it was felt that 
certain groups of people, as a consequence of their life 
situation, would rely more heavily on one type of defense than 
the other. Specifically a group of Born Again Christians 
formed a criterion group since it was hypothesized that they 
would rely most heavily on the UR defense. Similarly, a group 
of police officers were asked to participate since it was felt 
that because of the dangerous nature of their profession they 





A total of 264 respondents from both Lakehead University 
and the Thunder Bay community were recruited to participate in 
this study. Respondents belonged to one of four groups. 
Group 1. Respondents in this group consisted of 150 
students enrolled in an Introductory Psychology course at 
Lakehead University. The group consisted of 57 males and 93 
females, ranging in age from 18 to 46 years with a mean age of 
21.3 years. 
Group This group consisted of 59 respondents, 13 male 
and 46 female, enrolled in two, third year psychology courses 
offered in the spring semester at Lakehead University. These 
respondents ranged in age from 18 to 53 years, with a mean age 
of 27.2 years. 
Group 3. Respondents in this group consisted of 20 Born 
Again Christians. These respondents were members of a group 
that conducted prayer meetings on a regular weekly basis. The 
group consisted of 7 males and 13 females ranging in age from 
19 to 55 years with a mean age of 38.4 years. 
Group 4. Respondents in this group consisted of 35 police 
officers from the Thunder Bay Police Force. There were 32 
males and 3 females ranging in age from 23 to 58 years with a 
mean age of 33.3 years. 
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Instruments 
Threat Index (Tl) (see Appendix C). Based on Kelly's 
(1955) Theory of Personal Constructs, the TI requires the 
respondent to rate "self" and "own death" on each of 40 bipolar 
dimensions (i.e., good-bad, kind-cruel, satisfied-dissatisfied, 
etc.). The frequency with which the respondent rates "self" 
and "own death" on the same pole of each construct provides a 
score indicative of the degree to which "own death" is integra- 
ted in the concept of self. The higher the score, the less the 
respondent fears death. The highest possible score is 40. 
Templer Death Anxiety Scale (DAS) (see Appendix D) .. The 
DAS requires the respondent to anwer "true" or "false" to 15 
statements about emotional reactions to death and dying. The 
higher the score (which can range from zero to 15), the more 
frequently the respondent will have reacted to statements that 
indicate he or she has anxiety about death. 
Collett-Lester Fear of Death Scale (CL) (see Appendix E). 
This scale assesses a respondent's overall fear of death as 
well as fear of death of self (DS), fear of death of other 
(DO), fear of dying of self (DYS), and fear of dying of other 
(DYO). The scores for each scale were transformed to range 
from zero to 100, in order to give a sense of the magnitude of 




The present study consisted of several procedures. The 
rationale and selection of items was based on a homogenous 
keying method. One hundred twenty-nine statements devised on a 
rational basis were written and served as a pool of statements 
from which homogenous keying could be undertaken (see Appendix 
A). Items were derived from Yalom's explicit comprehensive 
descriptions of the ultimate rescuer and specialness defenses. 
Yalom's (1980) descriptions and examples of the specialness and 
ultimate rescuer defenses were used as anchor points for the 
item writing. 1 Items:.were written to reflect these descrip- 
tions. His description of the specialness defense included 
descriptors such as beliefs in specialness, leadership, 
inviolability, self-sufficiency, standing out from nature, 
individuation, autonomy, separateness, and so on. He also 
included descriptions of a characterological nature that 
reflected specialness, such as the compulsive hero, the 
workaholic, the narcissist, the agressive and controlling type. 
For the ultimate rescuer his descriptors included, beliefs 
in god, afterlife, supreme being, supernatural being and 
personal god. This also included a belief in a higher cause, 
figure or leader including a healing physician or employer. 
Descriptors also included striving towards fusion, joining, 
merging or embeddedness, search for strength outside self. 
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dependency, non-agression, and others. 
The main themes were then expanded, when writing the 
items, however care was taken to ensure that each item was 
reflective of Yalom's (1980) descriptions. 
These statements were counterbalanced to minimize response 
sets (Scott, 1968) and then administered to 150 psychology 
students at Lakehead University (Group T). Subjects were 
required to respond to each statement on a 5 point Likert type 
scale, with 1 representing strong disagreement and 5 represent- 
ing strong agreement. As a consequence of counterbalancing, a 
special conversion method was needed which would allow all of 
the items to be scored in the same direction. To accomplish 
this the scores of negatively keyed items were reversed by 
subtracting the values from 6. Thus on the Likert scale, a 
score of 5 on a negatively keyed item would receive a value of 
1 (6 - 5 = 1). Utilizing the homogenious keying approach item 
total correlations were computed for the specialness and 
ultimate rescuer items, using the Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient. Those items with correlation coef- 
ficients significant at the^level of .001 or better were chosen 
to represent the two scales. Each scale consisted of 15 
discriminating counter-balanced items. Table 1 presents the 
final UR and SP scale items numbered as they appeared in the 
questionnaire (also see Appendix b). Cronbach's (1951) Alpha 
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was employed to test the internal consistency reliability of 
each scale. While the original subject to item ratio (150/129) 
raised some concern regarding variance estimates, subsequent 
analysis of the final version of the scales (150/15) success- 
fully met the 3/1 ratio. Factor analytic procedures, utilizing 
alpha factoring and varimax rotation, were carried out to 
determine the factoral purity of each scale. 
Cross validation procedures were undertaken which con- 
sisted of administering both scales to a second, similar 
population (Group 2). As with Group 1, item-total correlations 
were calculated. 
Construct validation procedures involved comparing scores 
on the UR and SP scales with scores on three conscious fear of 
death measures, the TI, DAS, and the CL. In the first in- 
stance, Pearson product-moment correlations were computed on 
these scores for the general student population (Group 2). As 
Brown (1976) suggests, construct validity involves precisely 
defining a trait or construct being measured and:specifyip>g the 
relationship expected between test scores and other variables. 
In essence the UR and SP scales are assumed to be measuring 
defense against death anxiety. Moreover, this trait was 
predicted to correlate with conscious fear of death measures 
(TI, DAS, CL). It was argued that the more effectively anxiety 
is kept from consciousness (via these defenses) the lesser will 
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Tab1e 1 





1. When the body dies the spirit 
dies with it. 
3. Thlire exists a different, higher 
plain of existence. 
6. There does not exist a creator. 
7. People never really die. 
8. One should enjoy life as much as 
possible because death ends all 
existence. 
12. Religious and spiritual beliefs do 
not have much significance for me. 
13. The way to truth is through 
science. 
16. Science is more important than 
faith. 
17. At some point we will be reunited 
with our departed loved ones. 
20. A belief in an afterlife is 
important. 
22. Out-of-body experiences are not 
valid. 
23. Atheists are doomed. 
24. We have evidence that there is an 
afterlife. 
29. Man's spirit exists in some sep- 
arate form. 
30. Accounts of people dying and 
coming back to life are phony. 
2. I am a free thinker. 
4. I do not have leadership quali- 
ties. 
5. In group discussions I do not say 
very much. 
9. I am not usually admired by 
people. 
10. I am more aggressive than most 
people. 
11. I consider myself to be special. 
14. I am a person who is powerful. 
15. Most people see me as ordinary. 
18. Taking control over situations is 
one of the things I do best. 
19. In group discussions I do not 
command much attention. 
21. My opinion is highly regarded by 
others. 
25. I am consistently advancing. 
26. As an individual I am special and 
unique in a number of ways. 
27. Others would not describe me as 
powerful. 
28. Others would not see me as having 
leadership qualities. 
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be the conscious fear of death. It was theorized that 
support for construct validity would be apparent if negative 
correlations were found to occur between the measures of 
defense (SP and UR scores) and conscious fear of death 
scores. Indeed, Templer has described low scores on the 
DAS (1972) as indicating defense against death anxiety. 
He also suggested that the death anxiety scale may be used 
as a measure of defense. A second construct validation 
procedure involved administering the conscious fear of 
death tests and the UR and SP scales to two criterion groups: 
a group of born again Christians representing the UR criterion 
group (Group 3); and a group of police officers representing 
the specialness criterion group (Group 4). It was predicted 
that each criterion group would score high on the scales 
they represent while at the same time score low on the 
fear of death tests. To determine this, t-tests between 
the test scores of the general student population (Group 
2) and the two criterion groups (Groups 3 and 4) were calcula- 
ted. A final t-test was calculated between the two criterion 
groups. 
Results 
The corrected item-total correlation coefficients 
and alphas for the UR and SP scales are presented in Appendix 
F. Internal consistency reliability measured by Cronbach's 
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Alpha for the SP scale was .82 with the corrected item- 
total correlation coefficients ranging from .32 (p < .001) 
to .61 (p <.001). The alpha for the UR scale was .89 with 
the corrected item-total correlations ranging from .34 
(p <.001) to .76 (p <.001). Alphas of .82 and .89 demon- 
strated that each scale has high internal consistency reliabi- 
lity. Factor analysis was the first of four procedures 
used to establish the validity of the test. All thirty 
items were factor analyzed (n = 150) using alpha factoring 
with varimax rotation, an orthogonal factoring procedure. 
The 3 factor solution best met the requirements for validity, 
minimizing the number of interpretable factors while maximizing 
the loadings on those factors. The varimax rotated factor 
matrix, presented in Table 2, shows that the UR scale items 
all loaded significantly on factor 1 with no overlap on 
the other two factors. The SP scale items loaded significantly 
on both factors 2 and 3 with some overlap on three items. 
Factor 1 accounted for 47% of the variance and consisted 
entirely of the UR items. Factor 2 accounted for the greater 
percentage of the scale variance with 41%, while factor 
3 accounted for 12% of the variance. Factor 2 appears 
to be related to a stereotypical charismatic leader notion 
of specialness, while factor 3 appears to be more related 
to the idea of specialness through admiration for ones 
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Table 2 
Alpha Factoring Data; Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix 

























































































































Significant factor loadings 
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accomplishments. 
In an attempt to cross-validate these findings, both 
scales were administered to another sample of university 
students enrolled in two, third-year psychology courses. 
Corrected item-total correlation coefficients were calculated 
for both scales the results of which are presented in Appendix 
G. As can be seen, the SP and UR scales had alphas of 
.87 and .86 respectively. The corrected item-total■correlation 
coefficients for the SP scale ranged from .29 (p <.05) 
to .71 (p < .001) while the UR scale ranged from a non- 
significant .18 to .77 (p .001). While one item dropped 
to .18, the remainder of the items were all significant 
with probabilities of less than .01. These findings are 
quite similar to those obtained in the first administration 
of the scales (Appendix F) and provide good evidence for 
the cross validity of the scales. 
To examine the relationship of the defense scales to 
the fear of death measures, Pearson product-moment correlation 
I 
coefficients were calculated between the UR and SP scales 
and the CL, DAS and TI scores of group 2 The 
findings indicated a significant correlation between the 
SP scale and the total scores for the CL ( r ~= . 34 , 
P < .009) and two of the CL snhscal'es for group 2 (Table 3). 
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Table 3 
Pearson Correlations Between UR and Scale Scores and Fear of 
Death Measures 
FOD Measures UR SP 
INT .12 -.04 
DAS .03 -.20 
CLT .09 -.34* 
DS -.11 -.17 
DO .15 -.36* 
DYS -.01 -.37* 
DYO -.04 -.12 
"P <.01. 
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These findings demonstrate a relationship between higher 
speciainess defense, and lower fear of death as measured 
by the overall score of the CL. On the subscales of the 
CL, it was found that the SP scale correlated significantly 
with the DO scale (r = -.36, p < .006) and the DYS scale 
(r = -.37, p <.004). These findings suggest that increasing 
specialness defense is significantly and negatively related 
to the fear an individual has about the death of others 
(friends, loved ones) and the fear of the dying of self 
(pain, suffering). The UR scale failed to correlate with 
any of the conscious fear of death tests. An interesting, 
although unexpected finding was uncovered concerning the 
fear of death tests used in the study. While the DAS and 
CL correlated highly, Cr = .64, p <.001) the TI, reported 
in the literature to correlate with the other fear of death 
scales, failed to correlate with the other measures (see 
Table 4). 
In an attempt to establish the construct validity 
of both scales, comparisons were made between Group 2 (univer- 
sity students) and Group 3 (born again Christians) and 
between Group 2 and Group 4 (police men and women). These 
comparisons were based on t-tests calculated between each 
group on each of the dependent measures. The results of 
the first comparison, presented in Table 5, indicated signifi- 
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Table 4 
Intercorrelations of the Fear of Death Scales 
Scale INT DAS CLT (DS) (DO) (DYS) (DYO) 
INT -.19 -.24 -.28* -.21 -.26* 0.13 






* P. < .05. ** P. <.001 
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Table 5 
T-Tests: Group Comparisons 
Comparisons Variable Means T-Ratio 
Probability 






























































































































































cant differences between groups on the UR scale (t = 5.97 
p <.00l), and the scores on the TI (t = 3.82, p < .001), 
the DAS (t = 4.89, p < .001), the CL (t = 5.16, p < .001) 
and each of its sub-scales. Thus, Group 3 was found to 
have significantly higher UR scores as well as significantly 
lower fear of death scores on each of the conscious fear 
of death measures. No differences between groups were 
observed on the SP scores. 
A similar analysis was undertaken between Group 2 
and Group 4. The results of this analysis, presented 
in Table 5, reveal only one significant difference between 
the groups on the DO subscales of the CL. In this instance, 
the police officers were significantly less afraid of 
the death of others than were the university students. 
A final analysis was undertaken to compare Group 
3 with Group 4 on all of the dependent variables. The 
results of the t-tests (Table 5) revealed significant 
differences between groups on the TI (t = -4.65, p < .001), 
the DAS (t= 3.69, p < .001), the CL (t = 4.18, p < ,001) 
and each of its sub-scales and the UR ( t = -7.93, 
p < .001). These findings suggest that for" individuals 
in the born again Christians group "ovm death" was' integrated 
into their concept of "self" far more than it was for 
the police officers. Moreover, they demonstrated a signifi- 
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cantly lower fear of death than the police officers as measured 
by the DAS, the CL and each of its subscales. In addition, 
their overall defense against conscious fear of death was 
higher than that of the police because of their high utilization 
of the UR defense. No differences between the groups were 
found on the SP scale. 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to develop a psychometrically 
reliable and valid instrument that measures the beliefs one 
utilizes as a defense against death anxiety. By doing so 
it will enable us to establish how these defenses relate 
to cognitive fear of death. The results are encouraging 
regarding the establishment of a new psychometric instrument, 
that will enable researchers to investigate death anxiety 
from a new perspective. 
The results show that belief in an ultimate rescuer 
and personal specialness can be reliably measured as well 
as providing some support for the validity of these scales. 
The data suggest that a relationship exists between increasing 
UR and SP defenses, and lower fear of death as measured by 
the various fear of death instruments. The implication of 
this relationship is that the current fear of death measures 
are in fact tapping a superficial cognitive fear as suggested 
by the proponents of the indirect approach of assessing death 
47. 
anxiety. 
Analysis of each scale reveals encouraging findings. 
Both the SP and UR scales have good reliability, are factorally 
sound and are cross valid. Although some support was estab- 
lished, the results are somewhat discouraging with respect 
to construct validity. The expected negative correlation 
was not found for the UR scale when correlated with fear 
of death test measures obtained from Group 2 (university 
students). The SP scale, however, did negatively correlate 
with at least one of the conscious fear of death measures, 
the CL (p < .009), indicating that use of the SP defense 
was associated with significantly lower fear of death. 
Conversely, when the scale scores of criterion groups 
representing each scale were compared to the test scores 
of the general student population, the Born Again Christians 
group had significantly higher UR scores and significantly 
lower fear of death scores than the general student population 
(Table 5), while the Police Officers group was not significantly 
different from the general student population (Table 5). 
These findings indicate that the UR group of Born Again Chris- 
tians, endorsed the UR defense more frequently than the other 
groups and this was associated with a lower fear of death. 
One possible explanation for the former finding centers 
on the fact that the CL is a multidimensional instrument. 
48. 
It is interesting that the SP scale correlated with two of 
the CL subscales (Death of Other and Dying of Self) suggesting 
that this scale may tap into attitudes related to the death 
of friends, family and loved ones as well as attitudes related 
to the pain and suffering involved in the process of dying 
oneself. The possibility exists that the structure of the 
SP scale is such that it taps into very specific dimensions 
that do not appear in unidimensional scales such as the DAS. 
The fact that the DAS correlated with the CL, however,provides 
evidence that both instruments share elements in common. 
One unexpected finding was the failure of the TI to 
correlate with any of the other fear of death instruments. 
Earlier research has demonstrated a significant relationship 
between the TI, the CL and the DAS (Kreiger, et al, 1974; 
Kreiger, 1977; Neimeyer & Chapman, 1978; Wood & Robinson, 
1982) but in this study these findings failed to emerge. 
Unfortunately, no explanation for these results are apparent 
at this time. 
Contrary to predictions, the SP scale failed to discrimin- 
ate between either of the criterion groups. One possible 
explanation of this finding could be that the police men 
and women of the Thunder Bay Police Force may not be that 
different from the general population in how they view them- 
selves and their occupation. It could be that in a small 
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community such as Thunder Bay the dangers inherent in being a 
police officer are considerably less than that of larger urban 
centers. As a consequence the perception of danger associated 
with the job could be so slight as to result in little reliance 
on the SP defense. A comparison between Group 3 (Born Again 
Christians) and Group 4 (Police Officers) presented in Table 5 
support this explanation. If the police officers were embrac- 
ing the SP defense as predicted, their scores on the fear of 
death measures would not have been significantly different from 
the born again Christians' scores. Moreover, the SP scores of 
both groups were not significantly different suggesting that 
the police officers used the SP defense in a similar fashion to 
the born again Christian group. 
It is much more difficult to identify criterion groups for 
the SP defense relative to the UR defense. The main reason is 
that a belief in an ultimate rescuer is a belief in some 
external source such as God, religion, greater power, etc. 
Consequently, it is easier to find individuals who have these 
beliefs in common. A belief in specialness is an internal, 
personal belief about one's self. Because it is internal it is 
difficult to identify individuals or groups who have this 
common belief about themselves. Indeed, it may have been more 
appropriate to use fire department personnel as the criterion 
group since that occupation involves far greater risk than 
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that of police officers. In fact, attempts were made to do 
just that but the fire department failed to respond to a request 
for their personnel to be included in the study. 
In general, some evidence for the construct validity of at 
least the UR scale has been provided. Further research with 
the SP scale is needed, perhaps through the use of different 
criterion groups, before any definitive statements about the 
scale can be made. As a consequence of these scales, a new 
method of investigation has been established that bridges the 
theoretical and methodological gap between the constructs of 
fear of death and death anxiety. 
The present study has shown that thebeliefs in an ultimate 
rescuer and specialness can be reliably measured and has 
established some support pertaining to their role as defenses 
against death anxiety, as suggested by Yalora (1980). To 
assert that the results obtained using these scales verify 
that actual defense mechanisms are in operation is somewhat 
premature. The extent to which, if at all, these beliefs 
serve as significant defenses against death anxiety must be 
better substantiated before any conclusive statements can be 
made. Further research involving new criterion groups, new 
sample populations and convergent/divergent validation proced- 
ures may add to the understanding of these scales and help 
clarify their relationship with primal death anxiety. 
While the relationship between the UR and SP scales and 
conscious fear of death measures was not as stable as predic- 
ted, the results partially support Yalom's (1980) hypothesis 
that an individual’s conscious fear of death is determined by 
the extent to which the individual utilizes the UR and SP 
defense to protect himself or herself from death anxiety. 
52. 
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Original UR and SP Items 
This appendix contains the original 129 UR and SP items 
presented in the questionnaire format, that was administered 
to the 150 introductory psychology students at Lakehead Univer- 
sity. The final UR and SP scales were derived from these 
items. 
Questionnaire 
This questionnaire involves a series of statements to which 
you are being asked to indicate your agreement or disagreement. 
In front of each item is a space in which you can record your 
opinion in accordance with the following scale: 




5 strong agreement 
The extent of your agreement or disagreement should reflect 
your first impression of the item. Please respond to every state- 
ment . 
1.   When confronted with a dilemma I am more likely work it 
out alone than to ask someone else’s opinion. 
2.   We are all predestined. 
3. I often make my own time limits and deadlines. 
4.   It is possible that people who have died and were 
revived have met the creator. 
5.    Most people would not admire me. 
6.   You can always find help somewhere. 
7.   Others would not describe me as powerful. 
8.   There exists a different, higher plain of existence. 
9.   There is a benevolent God in heaven. 
10.   Reincarnatin is not possible. 
/ 
11.   Religious and spiritual beliefs do not have much signi- 
ficance for me. 
12.   Other people are the most important thing in my life. 
13.   Man's spirit exists in some separate form. 
14.   People are rarely aware of the fact that I am disap- 
pointed or angry with them. 
64. 
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5 strong agreement 
15.   The thought of blending into a crowd is undesirable 
to me. 
16. ~ : It ^does not bother'me when people are-late' or when events do 
not begin on time. 
17.   Death is not necessarily a negative thing. 
18.   Taking control over situations is one of the things I 
do best. 
19.   I appreciate and depend on the help and advice of others. 
2G.    Taking risks is something I rarely enjoy doing. 
21.   Doing things for others is extremely satisfying. 
22.   I am not really independent. 
23.   In group discussions I do not say very much. 
24.   I usually make a good first impression. 
25.   I do not have leadership qualities. 
26.   .If dying, my will to live will not pull me through. 
27.   One of the most important functions of a friend is that 
he be available when needed. 
28.   A belief in an afterlife is important. 
29. We are rewarded for living a good life. 
30. Atheists are doomed. 
31.   I am very disappointed when someone I counted on lets 
me down. 
32.   There exists an afterlife. 
33.   Man is no more than a highly evolved animal. 
65 
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5 strong agreement 
34.   There exists a supreme being. 
35.   There is something better after life, 
36.   I need people very much. 
37.   I have a special purpose in life. 
38.   There does not exist a creator. 
39.   My life’s projects will work toward the benefit of man. 
40.   I stand out from nature rather than merging with it. 
41.   Death is a tragic waste. 
42.   I often need help from other people. 
43.   My opinion is highly regarded by others. 
44.   I feel I have something of value to teach others about 
life. 
45.   I find it almost impossible to get ahead. 
46.   One should never depend on others. 
47. One should enjoy life as much as possible because death 
ends all existence. 
48. Religion is not important. 
49. I am not considered important by others. 
50. I hope to achieve a great deal in my life. 
51. I am often upset or depressed by other pao_p.Le'.s problems 
52.   I can predict at what age I will die. 
53. Science is more important than faith. 
I consider myself to be special. 54. 
66. 
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5 strong agreement 
55.   My birth sign accurately reflects my personality. 
56.   I am a free thinker. 
57.   I believe that^depending on others is important. 
58.   I fear rejection a great deal. 
59.   I do not find dangerous situations exciting. 
60.   In group situations I tend to be a leader. 
61.   I am a workaholic. 
62.   I will not get cancer. 
63.   I will live long enough to complete my life goals. 
64.   I do not believe in an afterlife. 
65.   When the body dies the spirit dies with it. 
66.   I have no interest in having my fortune read. 
67.   I do not mind criticism. 
68.   I often do things I do not wish to. 
69.   I will live until I am very old. 
70.   I am usually not admired by people. 
71.   Winning is very important to me. 
72.   Most people see me as ordinary. 
73.   People who have died and were medically revived often 
report feelings of peace, tranquility and describe a dark,, 
narrow tunnel with a bright light at the end. These 
phenomenon are proof of life after death. 
I do not like other people's opinions. 74. 
67. 
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5 strong agreement 
75.   Man is really powerless in this existence. 
76.   People are seldom interested in what I have to say. 
77.   People never really die. 
78.   Accounts of people dying and coming back to life are phony. 
79.   Others would describe me as a workaholic. 
80.   Man really has no choice. 
81.   I have a special purpose in life. 
82.   Some day science will prolong life indefinitely. 
83.   As an individual I am special and unique in a number of ways. 
84.   Man does not create his own experience. 
85.   I believe that immortality is achieved through the 
transmission of one's genes to one's children. 
86.   I am consistently advancing. 
87.   I can carry a tremendous amount of responsibility. 
88.   I am very self-sufficient. 
89.   If I someday have a serious disease my will to live will 
take over and pull me through. 
90.   Most people do not see me as being special. 
91.   Fate plays no role in man's life. 
92.   God is important to me. 
93.   There is no one as important as me. 
94.   I fear nothing. 
95.    I am more aggressive than most people. 
68. 
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5 strong agreement 
96*   I will not live any longer than my friends will, 
97.   Those who claim to have died and were subsequently 
revived really didn't die. 
98.   Outdoing myself gives me great satisfaction. 
99.   I believe it is possible to make others happy simply 
by being happy myself. 
100.   Others would not see me as having leadership qualities. 
101.   I expect that I would survive a nuclear war. 
102.   We have evidence that there is an afterlife. 
103.   I am considered an overachiever by my peers. 
104.   I will live longer than most people. 
105.   I will be a success at whatever I try. 
106.   I do not seek the opinions of others. 
107.   I never have to look back, 
108.    Immortality can be achieved through one’s special qualities. 
109.   At some point we will be reunited with our departed 
loved ones. 
110.   In group discussionri do not command much attention. 
111.   Out-of-body experiences are not valid. 
112.   I find having a great deal of responsibility unpleasant. 
113.   We become external by joining the swirling life forces 
of nature. 
114.   Others see me as being very aggressive. 
115.   I am a person who is powerful. 
69. 
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5 strong agreement 
116.   The soul lives on after death. 
117.   There is an external force or being that loves and protects 
us. 
118.   How you live in this life effects what will happen to 
you in the afterlife. 
119.   I often retreat from situations. 
120.   I have no sense of personal freedom. 
121. It makes me feel uncomfortable to receive the undivided 
attention of others. 
122. One cannot achieve immortality through one's work. 
123.   Communication with someone who has died might someday be 
possible. 
124.   I need others more than they need me. 
125.   I will die from natural causes. 
126.   The way to truth is through science. 
127.   There is more than enough time in the day. 
128.    When help is offered I almost always accept it. 
129.   I can face threatening situations with little fear. 
70. 
Appendix B 
Specialness and Ultimate Rescuer 
This appendix contains the 
presented in the questionnaire format 
study. 
Scales (SP and UR) 
final SP and UR items 
that was used in this 
71 
Age:  
Sex: Female  Male 










This questionnaire involves a series of statements to whiGh 
you are being asked to indicate your agreement or disagreement. 
In front of each item is a space in which you can record your 
opinion in accordance with the following scale: 




5 strong agreement 
The extent of your agreement or disagreement should reflect 
your first impression of the item. Please respond to every statement. 
1.   When the body dies the spirit dies with it. 
2.   I am a free thinker. 
3.   There exists a different, higher plain of existence. 
4.   I do not have leadership qualities. 
5.   In group discussions I do not say very much. 
6.   There does not exist a creator. 
7.   People never really die. 
8.   One should enjoy life as much as possible because death 
ends all, existence. 
9.   I am not usually admired by people. 
10.   I am more-'-aggressive than most people. 
11.   I consider myself to be special. 
12.   Religious and spiritual beliefs do not have much signifi- 
cance for me. 
13.   The way to truth is through science. 
14.   I am a person who is powerful. 
15.   Most people see me as ordinary. 
Science is more important than faith. 16. 
73. 
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17.   At some point we will be reunited with our departed loved 
ones. 
18.   Taking control over situations is one of the things I do 
be s t. 
19.   In group discussions I do not command much attention. 
20.   A belief in an afterlife is important. 
21.   My opinion is highly regarded by others. 
22.   Out-of-body experiences are not valid. 
23.   Atheists are doomed. 
24.   We have evidence that there is an afterlife. 
25.   I am consistently advancing. 
26.   As an individual I am special and unique in a number of 
ways. 
27.   Others would not describe me as powerful. 
28.   Others would not see me as having leadership qualities. 
29. Man's spirit exists in some separate form. 
Accounts of people dying and coming back to life are phony. 30. 
Appendix C 
Threat Index (Tl) 
75. 
1 Self 
Below is a list of dimensions, each of which is made up 
of a pair of opposites. For each dimension, please CIRCLE 
the side with which you see yourself or your present life more 
closely associated. In some cases, you may feel as if both 
sides describe you to some degree, but please circle only one 
side of each dimension: the one that describes you better. 
For example, do you see yourself as more predictable or random? 
predictable  random 
empty meaningful 
lack of control  control 
satisfied  
relating to others 
pleasure  































not caring — 
crazy  
conforraing — 
animate  — 
weak  


































hope no hope 
77. 
2 Preferred Self 
For each of the dimensions below, please CIRCLE the side 
with which you more closely associate your Ideal Self or the 
way you would PREFER to be living. For ex^nple,, would you prefer 
to be more predictable or random? 
predictable  random 
empty meaningful 
lack of control   control 
satisfied dissatisfied 
relating to others 
pleasure  










sad   
personal  


















2 Preferred Self 
responsible  
bad  
not caring  












productive —  
learning  



























For each of the dimensions below, please CIRCLE the side 
with which you more closely associate Your Own Death, 
thinking of your own death as if it were to occur at this 
time in your life. 
predictable  random 
empty meaningful 
lack of control control 
satisfied dissatisfied 










helping others   being selfish 
specific  general 



















not caring — 




































hope no hope 
Appendix D 
Templer Death Anxiety Scale (DAS) 
82. 
Death Questionnaire 
The following questionnaire is being used to measure 
people's attitudes towards death and dying. Do NOT write 
your name on the questionnaire. Answer each item by circling 
either true (T) or false (F), and try to respond as honestly 
as you can. Thanks for your help. 
Please Circle Answer 
1. I am very much afraid to die. T F 
2. The thought of death seldom enters T F 
my mind. 
3. It does not make me nervous when T F 
people talk about death. 
4. I dread to think about having to have T F 
an operation. 
5. I am not at all afraid to die, T F 
6. I am not particularly afraid of getting T F 
cancer. 
7. The thought of death never bothers me. T F 
8. I am often distressed by the way time T F 
flies so very rapidly. 
9. I fear dying a painful death. T 
10. The subject of life after death troubles T 
me. 
11. I am really scared of having a heart T F 
attack. 
12. I often think about how short life T F 
really is. 
13. I shudder when I hear people talking T F 
about World War III. 
14. The sight of a dead body is horrifying T F 
to me. 
15. I feel that the future holds nothing'for T F 




Collett-Lester Fear of Death Scale (CL) 
84. 
Questionnaire 
Here is a series of general statements. You are to indicate 
how much you agree or disagree with them. Record your opinion in 








-1 slight disagreement 
-2 moderate disagreement 
-3 strong disagreement 
Read each item and decide quickly how you feel about it; then 
record the extent of your agreement or disagreement. Put down 
your first impressions. Please answer every one. 
  1. I would avoid death at all costs. 
  2. I would experience a great loss if someone close to me died. 
  3. I would not feel anxious in the presence of someone I knew 
was dying, 
  4. The total isolation of death frightens me. 
  5. I am disturbed by the physical degeneration involved in a 
slow death. 
  6. I would not mind dying young. 
  7. I accept the death of others as the end of their life on 
earth. 
  8. I would not mind visiting a senile friend. 
  9. I would easily adjust after the death of someone close to 
me. 
 10. If I had a choice as to whether or not a friend should be 
informed he/she is dying, I would tell him/her. 
11. I would avoid a friend who was dying. 
 12. Dying might be an interesting experience. 
 13. I would like to be able to communicate with the spirit of 
a friend who has died. 
 14. I view death as a release from earthly suffering. 
 15. The pain involved in dying frightens me. 
 16. I would want to know if a friend were dying. 
85. 
Appendix F 
Internal Consistency Reliability Data; 



































































Note. All correlations significant at p < .001 
.89 
Appendix G 
Cross Validation Data 
86 

































































Alpha .87 '.86 
P < .05. 
p < .01. 
p < .001 
